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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the effects of an additional trusted relay node on the secrecy of multiple-access
wiretap channel (MAC-WT) by considering the model of multiple-access relay wiretap channel (MARC-WT). More
specifically, first, we investigate the discrete memoryless MARC-WT. Three inner bounds (with respect to decode-
forward (DF), noise-forward (NF) and compress-forward (CF) strategies) on the secrecy capacity region are provided.
Second, we investigate the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT, and present an outer bound on the secrecy
capacity region of this degraded model. Finally, we investigate the Gaussian MARC-WT, and find that the NF and
CF strategies help to enhance Tekin-Yener’s achievable secrecy rate region of Gaussian MAC-WT. Moreover, we
find that if the channel from the transmitters to the relay is less noisy than the channels from the transmitters to the
legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, the achievable secrecy rate region of the DF strategy is even larger than the
corresponding regions of the NF and CF strategies.
Index Terms
Multiple-access wiretap channel, relay channel, secrecy capacity region.
I. INTRODUCTION
Equivocation was first introduced into channel coding by Wyner in his study of wiretap channel [1]. It is a
kind of discrete memoryless degraded broadcast channels. The objective is to transmit messages to the legitimate
receiver, while keeping the wiretapper as ignorant of the messages as possible. Based on Wyners work, Leung-Yan-
Cheong and Hellman studied the Gaussian wiretap channel (GWC) [2], and showed that its secrecy capacity was
the difference between the main channel capacity and the overall wiretap channel capacity (the cascade of main
channel and wiretap channel).
After the publication of Wyner’s work, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] investigated a more general situation: the broadcast
channels with confidential messages (BCC). In this model, a common message and a confidential message were
sent through a general broadcast channel. The common message was assumed to be decoded correctly by the
legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, while the confidential message was only allowed to be obtained by the
legitimate receiver. This model is also a generalization of [4], where no confidentiality condition is imposed. The
capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region of BCC [3] were totally determined, and the results
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2were also a generalization of those in [1]. Furthermore, the capacity-equivocation region of Gaussian BCC was
determined in [22].
By using the approach of [1] and [3], the information-theoretic security for other multi-user communication
systems has been widely studied, see the followings.
• For the broadcast channel, Liu et al. [5] studied the broadcast channel with two confidential messages (no
common message), and provided an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region. Furthermore, Xu et al. [6]
studied the broadcast channel with two confidential messages and one common message, and provided inner
and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region.
• For the multiple-access channel (MAC), the security problems are split into two directions.
– The first is that two users wish to transmit their corresponding messages to a destination, and meanwhile,
they also receive the channel output. Each user treats the other user as a wiretapper, and wishes to
keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the wiretapper. This model is usually called the
MAC with confidential messages, and it was studied by Liang and Poor [7]. An inner bound on the
capacity-equivocation region is provided for the model with two confidential messages, and the capacity-
equivocation region is still not known. Furthermore, for the model of MAC with one confidential message
[7], both inner and outer bounds on capacity-equivocation region are derived. Moreover, for the degraded
MAC with one confidential message, the capacity-equivocation region is totally determined.
– The second is that an additional wiretapper has access to the MAC output via a wiretap channel, and
therefore, how to keep the confidential messages of the two users as secret as possible from the additional
wiretapper is the main concern of the system designer. This model is usually called the multiple-access
wiretap channel (MAC-WT). The Gaussian MAC-WT was investigated in [8], [9]. An inner bound on the
capacity-equivocation region is provided for the Gaussian MAC-WT. Other related works on MAC-WT
can be found in [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16].
• For the interference channel, Liu et al. [5] studied the interference channel with two confidential messages,
and provided inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region. In addition, Liang et al. [17] studied
the cognitive interference channel with one common message and one confidential message, and the capacity-
equivocation region was totally determined for this model.
• For the relay channel, Lai and Gamal [18] studied the relay-eavesdropper channel, where a source wishes to
send messages to a destination while leveraging the help of a trusted relay node to hide those messages from
the eavesdropper. Three inner bounds (with respect to decode-forward, noise-forward and compress-forward
strategies) and one outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region were provided in [18]. Furthermore,
Tang et. al. [27] introduced the noise-forward strategy of [18] into the wireless communication networks, and
found that with the help of an independent interferer, the security of the wireless communication networks
is enhanced. In addition, Oohama [19] studied the relay channel with confidential messages, where a relay
helps the transmission of messages from one sender to one receiver. The relay is considered not only as a
3sender that helps the message transmission but also as a wiretapper who can obtain some knowledge about
the transmitted messages. Measuring the uncertainty of the relay by equivocation, the inner and outer bounds
on the capacity-equivocation region were provided in [19].
Recently, Ekrem and Ulukus [20] investigated the effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels
by considering a cooperative relay broadcast channel. They showed that user cooperation can increase the achievable
secrecy rate region of [5].
In this paper, we study the multiple-access relay wiretap channel (MARC-WT), see Figure 1. This model
generalizes the MAC-WT by considering an additional trusted relay node. The motivation of this work is to
investigate the effects of the trusted relay node on the secrecy of MAC-WT, and whether the achievable secrecy
rate region of [9] can be enhanced by using an additional relay node.
Fig. 1: The multiple-access relay wiretap channel
First, we provide three inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region (achievable secrecy rate regions) of the
discrete memoryless model of Figure 1. The decode-forward (DF), noise-forward (NF) and compress-forward (CF)
relay strategies are used in the construction of the inner bounds. Second, we investigate the degraded discrete
memoryless MARC-WT, and present an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of this degraded case. Finally,
the Gaussian model of Figure 1 is investigated, and we find that with the help of this additional trusted relay node,
Tekin-Yeners achievable secrecy rate region of the Gaussian MAC-WT [9] is enhanced.
In this paper, random variab1es, sample values and alphabets are denoted by capital letters, lower case letters
and calligraphic letters, respectively. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors and their sample values.
For example, UN denotes a random N -vector (U1, ..., UN ), and uN = (u1, ..., uN ) is a specific vector value in UN
that is the N th Cartesian power of U . UNi denotes a random N − i+ 1-vector (Ui, ..., UN ), and uNi = (ui, ..., uN )
is a specific vector value in UNi . Let PV (v) denote the probability mass function Pr{V = v}. Throughout the
paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II provides the achievable secrecy rate regions of the discrete
memoryless model of Figure 1. The Gaussian model of Figure 1 is investigated in Section III. Final conclusions
are provided in Section IV.
4II. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS MULTIPLE-ACCESS RELAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. Inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the discrete memoryless MARC-WT
The discrete memoryless model of Figure 1 is a five-terminal discrete channel consisting of finite sets X1, X2,
Xr, Y , Yr, Z and a transition probability distribution PY,Yr,Z|X1,X2,Xr (y, yr, z|x1, x2, xr). XN1 , XN2 and XNr are
the channel inputs from the transmitters and the relay respectively, while Y N , Y Nr , Z
N are the channel outputs
at the legitimate receiver, the relay and the wiretapper, respectively. The channel is discrete memoryless, i.e., the
channel outputs (yi, yr,i, zi) at time i only depend on the channel inputs (x1,i, x2,i, xr,i) at time i.
Definition 1: (Channel encoders) The confidential messages W1 and W2 take values in W1, W2, respectively.
W1 and W2 are independent and uniformly distributed over their ranges. The channel encoders fE1 and fE2 are
stochastic encoders that map the messages w1 and w2 into the codewords xN1 ∈ XN1 and xN2 ∈ XN2 , respectively.
The transmission rates of the confidential messages W1 and W2 are
log ‖W1‖
N and
log ‖W2‖
N , respectively.
Definition 2: (Relay encoder) The relay encoder ϕi is also a stochastic encoder that maps the signals (yr,1, yr,2, ..., yr,i−1)
received before time i to the channel input xr,i.
Definition 3: (Decoder) The decoder for the legitimate receiver is a mapping fD : YN → W1 × W2, with
input Y N and outputs Wˆ1, Wˆ2. Let Pe be the error probability of the legitimate receiver, and it is defined as
Pr{(W1,W2) 6= (Wˆ1, Wˆ2)}.
The equivocation rate at the wiretapper is defined as
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN ). (2.1)
A rate pair (R1, R2) (where R1, R2 ≥ 0) is called achievable with perfect secrecy if, for any  > 0 (where  is
an arbitrary small positive real number), there exists a sequence of codes (2NR1 , 2NR2 , N) such that
log ‖ W1 ‖
N
= R1,
log ‖ W2 ‖
N
= R2,
∆ ≥ R1 +R2 − , Pe ≤ . (2.2)
Note that the above secrecy requirement on the full message set also ensures the secrecy of individual message,
i.e., 1NH(W1,W2|ZN ) ≥ R1+R2− implies that 1NH(Wt|ZN ) ≥ Rt− for t = 1, 2, and the proof is as follows.
Proof: Since
0 ≥ R1 +R2 − − 1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN ) = 1
N
H(W1) +
1
N
H(W2)− 1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )− 
=
1
N
H(W1) +
1
N
H(W2)− 1
N
H(W1|ZN )− 1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN )− 
≥ 1
N
H(W1) +
1
N
H(W2)− 1
N
H(W1|ZN )− 1
N
H(W2|ZN )− 
=
1
N
I(W1;Z
N ) +
1
N
I(W2;Z
N )− , (2.3)
and 1N I(W1;Z
N ) ≥ 0, 1N I(W2;ZN ) ≥ 0, it is easy to see that 1N I(W1;ZN ) ≤ , 1N I(W2;ZN ) ≤ , which
implies that 1NH(Wt|ZN ) ≥ Rt −  for t = 1, 2. The proof is completed.
5The secrecy capacity region Rd is a set composed of all achievable secrecy rate pairs (R1, R2). Three inner
bounds (with respect to DF, NF and CF strategies) on Rd are provided in the following Theorem 1, 2, 3.
Our first step is to characterize the inner bound on the secrecy capacity region Rd by using Cover-El Gamal’s
Decode and Forward (DF) Strategy [23]. In the DF Strategy, the relay node will first decode the confidential
messages, and then re-encode them to cooperate with the transmitters. The superposition coding and random binning
techniques will be combined with the classical DF strategy [23] to characterize the DF inner bound of the discrete
memoryless MARC-WT. The following Theorem 1 shows the DF inner bound on Rd.
Theorem 1: (Inner bound 1: DF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region Rd1 (Rd1 ⊆ Rd) is as
follows,
Rd1 = {(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ min{I(X1;Yr|Xr, X2, V1, V2), I(X1, Xr;Y |X2, V2)} − I(X1;Z),
R2 ≤ min{I(X2;Yr|Xr, X1, V1, V2), I(X2, Xr;Y |X1, V1)} − I(X2;Z),
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(X1, X2;Yr|Xr, V1, V2), I(X1, X2, Xr;Y )} − I(X1, X2;Z)},
for some distribution
PY,Z,Yr,Xr,X1,X2,V1,V2(y, z, yr, xr, x1, x2, v1, v2) =
PY,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr|xr, x1, x2)PXr|V1,V2(xr|v1, v2)PX1|V1(x1|v1)PX2|V2(x2|v2)PV1(v1)PV2(v2).
Proof:
The achievable coding scheme is a combination of [26], [21] and [9], and the details about the proof are provided
in Appendix A.
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
• If we let Z = const (which implies that there is no wiretapper), the region Rd1 reduces to the following
achievable region Rmarc, where
Rmarc = {(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ min{I(X1;Yr|Xr, X2, V1, V2), I(X1, Xr;Y |X2, V2)},
R2 ≤ min{I(X2;Yr|Xr, X1, V1, V2), I(X2, Xr;Y |X1, V1)},
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(X1, X2;Yr|Xr, V1, V2), I(X1, X2, Xr;Y )}}. (2.4)
Here note that the achievable region Rmarc is exactly the same as the achievable DF region (DF inner bound
on the capacity region) of the discrete memoryless multiple-access relay channel [26], [21].
• If we let Yr = Y and V1 = V2 = Xr = const (which implies that there is no relay), the region Rd1 reduces
6to the region Rmac−wt, where
Rmac−wt = {(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)}. (2.5)
Also note that the region Rmac−wt is exactly the same as the achievable secrecy rate region of discrete
memoryless multiple-access wiretap channel [9].
The second step is to characterize the inner bound on the secrecy capacity region Rd by using the noise and
forward (NF) strategy. In the NF Strategy, the relay node does not attempt to decode the messages but sends
sequences that are independent of the transmitters’ messages, and these sequences aid in confusing the wiretapper.
More specifically, for a given input distribution of the relay, if the corresponding mutual information with the
legitimate receiver’s output is not less than that with the wiretapper’s output, we allow the legitimate receiver to
decode the sequence of the relay, and the wiretapper can not decode it. Therefore, in this case, the sequence of the
relay can be viewed as a noise signal to confuse the wiretapper.
On the other hand, if the corresponding mutual information with the legitimate receiver’s output is not more than
that with the wiretapper’s output, we allow both the receivers to decode the sequence of the relay. In this case, the
sequence of the relay does not make any contribution to the security of the discrete memoryless MARC-WT.
The following Theorem 2 shows the NF inner bound on Rd.
Theorem 2: (Inner bound 2: NF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region Rd2 (Rd2 ⊆ Rd) is as
follows,
Rd2 = convex closure of (L1
⋃
L2),
where L1 is given by
L1 =
⋃
PY,Z,Yr,Xr,X1,X2
:
I(Xr ;Y ) ≥ I(Xr ;Z)

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− I(X1, Xr;Z) +Rr,
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, Xr)− I(X2, Xr;Z) +Rr,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |Xr)− I(X1, X2, Xr;Z) +Rr.

,
Rr denotes
Rr = min{I(Xr;Y ), I(Xr;Z|X1), I(Xr;Z|X2)},
and L2 is given by
L2 =
⋃
PY,Z,Yr,Xr,X1,X2
:
I(Xr ;Z) ≥ I(Xr ;Y )

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− I(X1;Z|Xr),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1, Xr)− I(X2;Z|Xr),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y |Xr)− I(X1, X2;Z|Xr).

,
7here the joint probability PY,Z,Yr,Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr, xr, x1, x2, u) satisfies
PY,Z,Yr,Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr, xr, x1, x2) = PY,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr|xr, x1, x2)PXr (xr)PX1(x1)PX2(x2).
Proof:
The achievable coding scheme is a combination of [18, Theorem 3] and [9], and the details about the proof are
provided in Appendix B.
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 2, see the following.
• Since the two regions L1 and L2 are not necessarily contained by one another, by using time-sharing arguments,
it is easy to find a new achievable region which is the convex-closure of the union of the two regions.
• The region L1 is characterized under the condition that for a given input distribution of the relay, the
corresponding mutual information with the legitimate receiver’s output is not less than that with the wire-
tapper’s output (I(Xr;Y ) ≥ I(Xr;Z)). Then, in this case, the legitimate receiver is allowed to decode the
sequence of the relay, and the wiretapper is not allowed to decode it. The rate of the sequence is defined as
Rr = min{I(Xr;Y ), I(Xr;Z|X1), I(Xr;Z|X2)}, and the sequence is viewed as pure noise for the wiretapper.
• The region L2 is characterized under the condition that for a given input distribution of the relay, the corre-
sponding mutual information with the legitimate receiver’s output is not more than that with the wiretapper’s
output (I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z)). Then, in this case, both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper are allowed
to decode the sequence of the relay. The rate of the sequence is defined as Rr = I(Xr;Y ), and the sequence
does not make any contribution to the security of the discrete memoryless MARC-WT.
The third step is to characterize the inner bound on the secrecy capacity region Rd by using a combination
of Cover- El Gamals compress and forward (CF) strategy [23] and the NF strategy provided in Theorem 2, i.e.,
in addition to the independent codewords, the relay also sends a quantized version of its noisy observations to
the legitimate receiver. This noisy version of the relay’s observations helps the legitimate receiver in decoding the
transmitters’ messages, while the independent codewords help in confusing the wiretapper. The following Theorem
3 shows the CF inner bound on Rd.
Theorem 3: (Inner bound 3: CF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region Rd3 (Rd3 ⊆ Rd) is as
follows,
Rd3 = convex closure of (L3
⋃
L4),
where L3 is given by
L3 =
⋃
P
Y,Z,Yr,Yˆr,Xr,X1,X2
: I(Xr ;Y ) ≥ I(Xr ;Z)
R∗r1 − R∗ ≥ I(Yr ; Yˆr|Xr)

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− I(X1, Xr;Z) +R∗,
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y, Yˆr|X1, Xr)− I(X2, Xr;Z) +R∗,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− I(X1, X2, Xr;Z) +R∗.

,
R∗r1 = min{I(Xr;Z|X1), I(Xr;Z|X2), I(Xr;Y )}, R∗ is the rate of pure noise generated by the relay to confuse
the wiretapper, R∗r1 − R∗ is the part of the rate allocated to send the compressed signal Yˆr to help the legitimate
8receiver, and L4 is given by
L4 =
⋃
P
Y,Z,Yr,Yˆr,Xr,X1,X2
: I(Xr ;Z) ≥ I(Xr ;Y )
I(Xr ;Y ) ≥ I(Yr ; Yˆr|Xr)

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− I(X1;Z|Xr),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y, Yˆr|X1, Xr)− I(X2;Z|Xr),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− I(X1, X2;Z|Xr).

.
The joint probability PY,Z,Yr,Yˆr,Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr, yˆr, xr, x1, x2) satisfies
PY,Z,Yr,Yˆr,Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr, yˆr, xr, x1, x2) =
PYˆr|Yr,Xr (yˆr|yr, xr)PY,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr|xr, x1, x2)PXr (xr)PX1(x1)PX2(x2).
Proof:
The achievable coding scheme is a combination of [18, Theorem 4] and [9], and the details about the proof are
provided in Appendix C.
Remark 3: There are some notes on Theorem 3, see the following.
• Since the two regions L3 and L4 are not necessarily contained by one another, by using time-sharing arguments,
it is easy to find a new achievable region which is the convex-closure of the union of the two regions.
• The region L3 is characterized under the condition that for a given input distribution of the relay, the
corresponding mutual information with the legitimate receiver’s output is not less than that with the wiretapper’s
output (I(Xr;Y ) ≥ I(Xr;Z)). Then, in this case, the legitimate receiver is allowed to decode the sequence
of the relay, and the wiretapper is not allowed to decode it. Here note that if R∗ = R∗r1, this scheme is exactly
the same as the NF scheme.
• The region L4 is characterized under the condition that for a given input distribution of the relay, the corre-
sponding mutual information with the legitimate receiver’s output is not more than that with the wiretapper’s
output (I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z)). Then, in this case, both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper are allowed
to decode the sequence of the relay. However, the relay can still help to enhance the security of the discrete
memoryless MARC-WT by sending the compressed signal Yˆr to the legitimate receiver.
B. Outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT
Compared with the discrete memoryless MARC-WT (see Figure 1), the degraded case implies the existence of a
Markov chain (X1, X2, Xr, Yr)→ Y → Z. The secrecy capacity region Rdd of the degraded discrete memoryless
MARC-WT is a set composed of all achievable secrecy rate pairs (R1, R2). An outer bound on Rdd is provided
in the following Theorem 4.
9Theorem 4: (Outer bound) A single-letter characterization of the region Rddo (Rdd ⊆ Rddo) is as follows,
Rddo = {(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1, Xr;Y |X2, U)− I(X1;Z|U)
R2 ≤ I(X2, Xr;Y |X1, U)− I(X2;Z|U)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2, Xr;Y |U)− I(X1, X2;Z|U)}
for some distribution
PZ,Y,Yr,Xr,X1,X2,U (z, y, yr, xr, x1, x2, u) =
PZ|Y (z|y)PY,Yr|X1,X2,Xr (y, yr|x1, x2, xr)PU,X1,X2,Xr (u, x1, x2, xr).
Proof:
The details about the proof are provided in Appendix D.
Remark 4: The outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the degraded discrete memoryless MARC-WT
is generally loose, but it is still useful for the analysis of the outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the
Gaussian MARC-WT, and this is because the scalar Gaussian MARC-WT is always degraded. The capacity results
on the Gaussian MARC-WT will be given in the next section.
III. GAUSSIAN MULTIPLE-ACCESS RELAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we investigate the Gaussian multiple-access relay wiretap channel (GMARC-WT). The signal
received at each node is given by
Yr = X1 +X2 + Zr,
Y = X1 +X2 +Xr + Z1,
Z = X1 +X2 +Xr + Z2, (3.1)
where Zr ∼ N (0, Nr), Z1 ∼ N (0, N1), Z2 ∼ N (0, N2), and they are independent. The Gaussian noise vectors
ZNr , Z
N
1 and Z
N
2 are composed of i.i.d. components with probability distributions Zr ∼ N (0, Nr), Z1 ∼ N (0, N1)
and Z2 ∼ N (0, N2), respectively. The average power constraints of XN1 , XN2 and XNr are 1N
∑N
i=1E[X
2
1,i] ≤ P1,
1
N
∑N
i=1E[X
2
2,i] ≤ P2 and 1N
∑N
i=1E[X
2
r,i] ≤ Pr, respectively.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Subsection III-A shows the achievable secrecy rate regions
of GMARC-WT, and the numerical examples and discussions are given in Subsection III-B.
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A. Capacity results on GMARC-WT
Theorem 5: The DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the GMARC-WT is given by
Rg1 =
⋃
0≤γ≤1

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ min{ 12 log(1 + P1Nr ), 12 log(1 +
P1+γPr
N1
)} − 12 log P1+P2+Pr+N2P2+Pr+N2 ,
R2 ≤ min{ 12 log(1 + P2Nr ), 12 log(1 +
P2+(1−γ)Pr
N1
)} − 12 log P1+P2+Pr+N2P1+Pr+N2 ,
R1 +R2 ≤ min{ 12 log(1 + P1+P2Nr ), 12 log(1 + P1+P2+PrN1 )} − 12 log P1+P2+Pr+N2Pr+N2 .

. (3.2)
Proof:
First, let Xr = V1 + V2, where V1 ∼ N (0, γPr) and V2 ∼ N (0, (1− γ)Pr).
Let X1 =
√
(1−α)P1
γPr
V1 +X10, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and X10 ∼ N (0, αP1).
Analogously, let X2 =
√
(1−β)P2
(1−γ)Pr V2 +X20, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and X20 ∼ N (0, βP2).
Here note that V1, V2, X10 and X20 are independent random variables.
The region Rg1 is obtained by substituting the above definitions into Theorem 1, and maximizing α and β (the
maximum of Rg1 is achieved when α = β = 1). Thus, the proof of Theorem 5 is completed.
Theorem 6: The NF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the GMARC-WT is given by
Rg2 = convex closure of (G1
⋃
G2),
where G1 is given by
G1 =
⋃
N1≤N2

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1N1 )− 12 log(1 + P1+PrP2+N2 ) +Rr,
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P2N1 )− 12 log(1 + P2+PrP1+N2 ) +Rr,
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1+P2N1 )− 12 log(1 + P1+P2+PrN2 ) +Rr.

,
Rr = min{ 12 log(1 + PrP1+P2+N1 ), 12 log(1 + PrP2+N2 ), 12 log(1 + PrP1+N2 )}, and G2 is given by
G2 =
⋃
N1≥N2

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1N1 )− 12 log(1 + P1P2+N2 ),
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P2N1 )− 12 log(1 + P2P1+N2 ),
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1+P2N1 )− 12 log(1 + P1+P2N2 ).

.
Proof:
Here note that N1 ≤ N2 implies I(Xr;Y ) ≥ I(Xr;Z). The region G1 is obtained by substituting X1 ∼ N (0, P1),
X2 ∼ N (0, P2) and Xr ∼ N (0, Pr) into the region L1 of Theorem 2, and using the fact that X1, X2 and Xr are
independent random variables.
Analogously, N1 ≥ N2 implies I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z). The region G2 is obtained by substituting X1 ∼ N (0, P1),
X2 ∼ N (0, P2) and Xr ∼ N (0, Pr) into the region L2 of Theorem 2, and using the fact that X1, X2 and Xr are
independent random variables. Thus, the proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
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Theorem 7: The CF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the GMARC-WT is given by
Rg3 = convex closure of (G3
⋃
G4),
where G3 is given by
G3 =
⋃
N1≤N2

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1(Q+N1+Nr)N1(Nr+Q) )− 12 log(1 + P1+PrP2+N2 ) +R∗,
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P2(Q+N1+Nr)N1(Nr+Q) )− 12 log(1 + P2+PrP1+N2 ) +R∗,
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + (P1+P2)(Q+N1+Nr)N1(Nr+Q) )− 12 log(1 + P1+P2+PrN2 ) +R∗.

,
Q satisfies
1
2
log(1 +
P1 + P2 +Nr
Q
) ≤ min{1
2
log(1 +
Pr
P1 + P2 +N1
),
1
2
log(1 +
Pr
P2 +N2
),
1
2
log(1 +
Pr
P1 +N2
)},
and R∗ satisfies
0 ≤ R∗ ≤ min{1
2
log(1 +
Pr
P1 + P2 +N1
),
1
2
log(1 +
Pr
P2 +N2
),
1
2
log(1 +
Pr
P1 +N2
)}
−1
2
log(1 +
P1 + P2 +Nr
Q
),
and G4 is given by
G4 =
⋃
N1≥N2

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1(Q+N1+Nr)N1(Nr+Q) )− 12 log(1 + P1P2+N2 ),
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P2(Q+N1+Nr)N1(Nr+Q) )− 12 log(1 + P2P1+N2 ),
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + (P1+P2)(Q+N1+Nr)N1(Nr+Q) )− 12 log(1 + P1+P2N2 ).

,
here Q satisfies Q ≥ (P1+P2)2+(P1+P2)(Nr+N1)+NrN1Pr .
Proof:
Here note that N1 ≤ N2 implies I(Xr;Y ) ≥ I(Xr;Z). The region G3 is obtained by substituting X1 ∼ N (0, P1),
X2 ∼ N (0, P2), Xr ∼ N (0, Pr), Yˆr = Yr + ZQ1 and ZQ ∼ N (0, Q) into the region L3 of Theorem 3, and using
the fact that X1, X2 and Xr are independent random variables.
Analogously, N1 ≥ N2 implies I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z). The region G4 is obtained by substituting X1 ∼ N (0, P1),
X2 ∼ N (0, P2), Xr ∼ N (0, Pr), Yˆr = Yr + ZQ and ZQ ∼ N (0, Q) into the region L4 of Theorem 3, and using
the fact that X1, X2 and Xr are independent random variables. Thus, the proof of Theorem 7 is completed.
By using Theorem 4, we provide an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the GMARC-WT under the
condition that N2 ≥ N1, see the followings.
1Here note that Yˆr = Yr + ZQ is from the similar argument for the CF strategy of the Gaussian relay channel [28, pp. 402-403].
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Theorem 8: For the case that N2 ≥ N1, an outer bound Rgout on the secrecy capacity region of the GMARC-WT
is given by
Rgout =
⋃
0≤α,β1,β2,γ≤1

(R1, R2) : R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + Pr(α+β2−αβ2)+β2P1N1 )− 12 log(
C+γ(P1+P2+Pr+N2−C)
N2+Pr(α+β1−αβ1)+β1P2 ),
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + Pr(α+β1−αβ1)+β1P2N1 )− 12 log(
C+γ(P1+P2+Pr+N2−C)
N2+Pr(α+β2−αβ2)+β2P1 ),
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(C+γ(P1+P2+Pr+N1−C)N1 )− 12 log(
C+γ(P1+P2+Pr+N2−C)
N2+αPr
),

,
where C satisfies
C = max{N2 + Pr(α+ β1 − αβ1) + β1P2, N2 + Pr(α+ β2 − αβ2) + β2P1}.
Proof:
See Appendix E.
Theorem 9: Finally, remember that [9] provides an achievable secrecy rate region RGi of the Gaussian multiple-
access wiretap channel (GMAC-WT), and it is given by
RGi =

(R1, R2) : R1, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1N1 )− 12 log(1 + P1N2+P2 )
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P2N1 )− 12 log(1 + P2N2+P1 )
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + P1+P2N1 )− 12 log(1 + P1+P2N2 )

.
Proof:
The proof is in [9], and it is omitted here.
B. Numerical Examples and Discussions
Letting P1 = 5, P2 = 6, Pr = 20, N1 = 2, N2 = 14 and Q = 200, the following Figure 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the
inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the GMARC-WT for different values of Nr.
Compared with the achievable secrecy rate region RGi of GMAC-WT, it is easy to see that the NF region (Rg2)
and the CF region (Rg3) enhance the region RGi (no relay). The CF region is always smaller than the NF region,
and when Q→∞, the CF region tends to the NF region. For the DF region (Rg1), we find that when Nr is much
larger than N1, Rg1 is even smaller than RGi (see Figure 2). When Nr is close to N1 (still larger than N1), Rg1
is larger than RGi, but it is still smaller than the NF and CF regions (see Figure 3). When Nr is smaller than N1,
as we can see in Figure 4 and 5, the DF region Rg1 is larger than the NF and CF regions.
Figure 2, 3, 4 and 5 also show that there exists a gap between the inner and outer bounds, and the gap is reduced
as Nr decreases.
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Fig. 2: The bounds on the secrecy capacity region of GMARC-WT for Nr = 5
Fig. 3: The bounds on the secrecy capacity region of GMARC-WT for Nr = 2.3
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, first, we provide three inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region (achievable secrecy rate regions)
of the discrete memoryless model of Figure 1. The decode-forward (DF), noise-forward (NF), and compress-forward
(CF) relay strategies are used in the construction of these inner bounds. Second, we investigate the degraded discrete
memoryless MARC-WT, and present an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of this degraded case. Finally,
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Fig. 4: The bounds on the secrecy capacity region of GMARC-WT for Nr = 1.6
Fig. 5: The bounds on the secrecy capacity region of GMARC-WT for Nr = 0
we study the Gaussian MARC-WT, and find that the NF and CF strategies help to enhance Tekin-Yener’s achievable
secrecy rate region of Gaussian MAC-WT. Moreover, we find that if the channel from the transmitters to the relay
is less noisy than the channels from the transmitters to the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, the achievable
secrecy rate region of the DF strategy is even larger than the corresponding regions of the NF and CF strategies.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to show that any pair (R1, R2) ∈ Rd1 is achievable, i.e., for any
 > 0, there exists a sequence of codes (2NR1 , 2NR2 , N) such that log‖W1‖N = R1,
log‖W2‖
N = R2, Pe ≤  and
1
NH(W1,W2|ZN ) ≥ R1 +R2 − . The details are as follows.
The coding scheme combines the decode-and-forward (DF) strategy of MARC [21], random binning, superposition
coding, and block Markov coding techniques, see the followings.
Fix the joint probability mass function PY,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr|xr, x1, x2)PXr|V1,V2(xr|v1, v2)
PX1|V1(x1|v1)PX2|V2(x2|v2)PV1(v1)PV2(v2). For a given (R1, R2) ∈ Rd1, define the messages W1 and W2 taking
values in the alphabets W1 and W2, respectively, where
W1 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}, W2 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}.
Relay Code-books Construction:
For a given R∗1 ≥ 0, generate at random 2N(R1+R
∗
1) i.i.d. sequences vN1 according to PV N1 (v
N
1 ) =
∏N
i=1 PV1(v1,i).
Index them as vN1 (a1, b1), where a1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR1} and b1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
∗
1}. For convenience, define s1 =
(a1, b1), where s1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R1+R∗1)}.
Analogously, for a given R∗2 ≥ 0, generate at random 2N(R2+R
∗
2) i.i.d. sequences vN2 according to PV N2 (v
N
2 ) =∏N
i=1 PV2(v2,i). Index them as v
N
2 (a2, b2), where a2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR2} and b2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
∗
2}. For convenience,
define s2 = (a2, b2), where s2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R2+R∗2)}.
Generate at random 2N(R1+R
∗
1+R2+R
∗
2) i.i.d. sequences xNr according to PXNr |V N1 ,V N2 (x
N
r |vN1 , vN2 ) =∏N
i=1 PXr,i|V1,i,V2,i(xr,i|v1,i, v2,i). Index them as xNr (s1, s2), where s1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R1+R
∗
1)} and s2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R2+R∗2)}.
Transmitters’ Code-books Construction:
• For a given vN1 (s1), generate at random 2
N(R1+R
∗
1) i.i.d. sequences xN1 (w1, w
∗
1 |s1) (w1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}, w∗1 ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR∗1}, s1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R1+R∗1)}) according to
∏N
i=1 PX1|V1(x1,i|v1,i).
• Analogously, for a given vN2 (s2), generate at random 2
N(R2+R
∗
2) i.i.d. sequences xN2 (w2, w
∗
2 |s2) (w2 ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR2}, w∗2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
∗
2}, s2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R2+R∗2)}) according to
∏N
i=1 PX2|V2(x2,i|v2,i).
Encoding: We exploit the block Markov coding scheme, because, as argued in [23], the loss induced by this
scheme is negligible as the number of blocks n→∞. For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), encoding proceeds as follows.
First, for convenience, the messages w1, w∗1 , w2, w
∗
2 , s1 and s2 transmitted in the i-th block are denoted by w1,i,
w∗1,i, w2,i, w
∗
2,i, s1,i and s2,i, respectively.
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• (Channel encoders)
1) The message w∗1,i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) is randomly chosen from the set {1, 2, ..., 2NR
∗
1}. The transmitter 1
(encoder 1) sends xN1 (w1,1, w
∗
1,1|1, 1) at the first block, xN1 (w1,i, w∗1,i|w1,i−1, w∗1,i−1) (note that here s1,i =
(w1,i−1, w∗1,i−1)) from block 2 ≤ i ≤ n−1, and xN1 (1, 1|w1,n−1, w∗1,n−1) at block n (s1,n = (w1,n−1, w∗1,n−1)).
2) The message w∗2,i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) is randomly chosen from the set {1, 2, ..., 2NR
∗
2}. The transmitter 2
(encoder 2) sends xN2 (w2,1, w
∗
2,1|1, 1) at the first block, xN2 (w2,i, w∗2,i|w2,i−1, w∗2,i−1) (s2,i = (w2,i−1, w∗2,i−1))
from block 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, and xN2 (1, 1|w2,n−1, w∗2,n−1) at block n (s2,n = (w2,n−1, w∗2,n−1)).
• (Relay encoder)
The relay sends (vN1 (1, 1), v
N
2 (1, 1), x
N
r (1, 1, 1, 1)) at the first block, and
(vN1 (sˆ1,i), v
N
2 (sˆ2,i), x
N
r (sˆ1,i, sˆ2,i)) from block 2 ≤ i ≤ n, where sˆ1,i = (wˆ1,i−1, wˆ∗1,i−1) and sˆ2,i = (wˆ2,i−1, wˆ∗2,i−1).
Decoding: Decoding proceeds as follows.
1) (At the relay) At the end of block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the relay already has an estimation of the s1,i and s2,i (denoted
by sˆ1,i and sˆ2,i, respectively), and will declare that it receives wˆ1,i, wˆ∗1,i, wˆ2,i and wˆ
∗
2,i if this is the only quadruple
such that (xN1 (wˆ1,i, wˆ
∗
1,i|sˆ1,i), xN2 (wˆ2,i, wˆ∗2,i|sˆ2,i), xNr (sˆ1,i, sˆ2,i), v1(sˆ1,i), v2(sˆ2,i), yNr (i)) are jointly typical. Here
note that yNr (i) indicates the output sequence y
N
r in block i, sˆ1,i+1 = (wˆ1,i, wˆ
∗
1,i) and sˆ2,i+1 = (wˆ2,i, wˆ
∗
2,i). The
indexes sˆ1,i+1 and sˆ2,i+1 will be used in the i+ 1-th block.
Based on the AEP, the error probability Pr{(sˆ1,i+1, sˆ2,i+1) 6= (s1,i+1, s2,i+1)} goes to 0 if
R1 +R
∗
1 ≤ I(X1;Yr|Xr, V1, V2, X2), (A1)
R2 +R
∗
2 ≤ I(X2;Yr|Xr, V1, V2, X1), (A2)
R1 +R
∗
1 +R2 +R
∗
2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Yr|Xr, V1, V2). (A3)
2) (At the legitimate receiver) The legitimate receiver decodes from the last block, i.e., block n. At the end of
block i + 1, the legitimate receiver already has an estimation of the wˇ1,i+1, wˇ∗1,i+1, wˇ2,i+1 and wˇ
∗
2,i+1, and will
declare that it receives sˇ1,i+1 and sˇ2,i+1 if this is the only pair such that (xN1 (wˇ1,i+1, wˇ
∗
1,i+1|sˇ1,i+1), xN2 (wˇ2,i+1,
wˇ∗2,i+1|sˇ2,i+1), xNr (sˇ1,i+1, sˇ2,i+1), v1(sˇ1,i+1), v2(sˇ2,i+1), yN (i + 1)) are jointly typical. Here note that yN (i + 1)
indicates the output sequence yN in block i+ 1, sˇ1,i+1 = (wˇ1,i, wˇ∗1,i) and sˇ2,i+1 = (wˇ2,i, wˇ
∗
2,i).
Based on the AEP, the error probability Pr{(sˇ1,i+1, sˇ2,i+1) 6= (s1,i+1, s2,i+1)} goes to 0 if
R1 +R
∗
1 ≤ I(V1, Xr, X1;Y |V2, X2)
(a)
= I(Xr, X1;Y |X2, V2), (A4)
R2 +R
∗
2 ≤ I(V2, Xr, X2;Y |V1, X1)
(b)
= I(Xr, X2;Y |X1, V1), (A5)
R1 +R
∗
1 +R2 +R
∗
2 ≤ I(V1, V2, Xr, X1, X2;Y )
(c)
= I(Xr, X1, X2;Y ), (A6)
where (a) is from the Markov chain V1 → (Xr, X1, X2, V2)→ Y , (b) is from the Markov chain V2 → (Xr, X1, X2, V1)→
Y , and (c) is from the Markov chain (V1, V2)→ (Xr, X1, X2)→ Y .
By using (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5) and (A6), it is easy to check that Pe ≤ . It remains to show that
∆ ≥ R1 +R2 − , see the followings.
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Equivocation Analysis:
Similar to the equivocation analysis of [18, proof of Theorem 2], for simplicity, we only focus on the equivocation
of one block, see the followings.
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN ) = 1
N
(H(W1,W2, Z
N )−H(ZN ))
=
1
N
(H(W1,W2, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
2 )−H(XN1 , XN2 |W1,W2, ZN )−H(ZN ))
(a)
=
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 , XN2 ) +H(XN1 ) +H(XN2 )−H(XN1 , XN2 |W1,W2, ZN )−H(ZN ))
=
1
N
(H(XN1 ) +H(X
N
2 )− I(XN1 , XN2 ;ZN )−H(XN1 , XN2 |W1,W2, ZN )), (A7)
where (a) follows from (W1,W2) → (XN1 , XN2 ) → ZN , H(W1|XN1 ) = 0, H(W2|XN2 ) = 0, and XN1 is
independent of XN2 .
Consider the first term of (A7), the code-book generation of xN1 shows that the total number of x
N
1 is 2
N(R1+R
∗
1).
Thus, using the same approach as that in [7, Lemma 3], we have
1
N
H(XN1 ) ≥ R1 +R∗1 − 1,N , (A8)
where 1,N → 0 as N →∞.
Analogously, the second term of (A7) is bounded by
1
N
H(XN2 ) ≥ R2 +R∗2 − 2,N , (A9)
where 2,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the third term of (A7), since the channel is memoryless, and XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r are i.i.d. generated, we get
1
N
I(XN1 , X
N
2 ;Z
N ) = I(X1, X2;Z). (A10)
Now, we consider the last term of (A7). Given W1 and W2, the wiretapper does joint decoding at each block.
At the end of block 1, the wiretapper tries to find a unique pair (w˜∗1,1, w˜
∗
2,1) such that
(xN1 (w1,1, w˜
∗
1,1|1, 1), xN2 (w2,1, w˜∗2,1|1, 1), zN (1)) are jointly typical. At the end of block i (2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), the
wiretapper already has an estimation of the w˜∗1,i−1 and w˜
∗
2,i−1, and thus he also get s˜1,i = (w1,i−1, w˜
∗
1,i−1) and s˜2,i =
(w2,i−1, w˜∗2,i−1). Then he tries to find a unique pair (w˜
∗
1,i, w˜
∗
2,i) such that (x
N
1 (w1,i, w˜
∗
1,i|s˜1,i), xN2 (w2,i, w˜∗2,i|s˜2,i), zN (i))
are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the error probability Pr{(w˜∗1,i, w˜∗2,i) 6= (w∗1,i, w∗2,i)} goes to 0 if
R∗1 ≤ I(X1;Z|X2), (A11)
R∗2 ≤ I(X2;Z|X1), (A12)
R∗1 +R
∗
2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Z). (A13)
Then based on Fanos inequality, we have
1
N
H(XN1 , X
N
2 |W1,W2, ZN ) ≤ 3,N , (A14)
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where 3,N → 0 as N →∞.
Substituting (A8), (A9), (A10) and (A14) into (A7), we have
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN ) ≥ R1 +R∗1 +R2 +R∗2 − I(X1, X2;Z)− 1,N − 2,N − 3,N . (A15)
It is easy to see that if we let
R∗1 +R
∗
2 = I(X1, X2;Z), (A16)
and choose sufficiently large N such that 1,N + 2,N + 3,N ≤ , ∆ = 1NH(W1,W2|ZN ) ≥ R1 + R2 −  is
guaranteed.
Based on (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5), (A6), (A11), (A12) and (A16), the achievable region Rd1 is obtained.
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For Theorem 2, we only need to prove that the corner points of L1 and L2 are achievable, see the followings.
• (Case 1) If I(Xr;Y ) ≥ I(Xr;Z), we allow the legitimate receiver to decode xNr , and the wiretapper can not
decode it. For case 1, it is sufficient to show that the pair (R1, R2) ∈ L1 with the condition
R1 = I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− I(X1, Xr;Z) +Rr, R2 = I(X2;Y |Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr) (A17)
is achievable. The achievability proof of the other corner point (R1 = I(X1;Y |Xr)− I(X1;Z|X2, Xr), R2 =
I(X2;Y |X1, Xr)− I(X2, Xr;Z) +Rr) follows by symmetry.
• (Case 2) If I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z), we allow both the receivers to decode xNr . For case 2, it is sufficient to
show that the pair (R1, R2) ∈ L2 with the condition
R1 = I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− I(X1;Z|Xr), R2 = I(X2;Y |Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr) (A18)
is achievable. The achievability proof of the other corner point (R1 = I(X1;Y |Xr)− I(X1;Z|X2, Xr), R2 =
I(X2;Y |X1, Xr)− I(X2;Z|Xr)) follows by symmetry.
Fix the joint probability mass function PY,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr|xr, x1, x2)PXr (xr)PX1(x1)PX2(x2). Define the
messages W1, W2 taking values in the alphabets W1, W2, respectively, where
W1 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}, W2 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}.
Code-book Construction for the Two Cases:
• Code-book construction for case 1:
– First, generate at random 2N(Rr−
′
) (where 
′
is a small positive number) i.i.d. sequences at the relay
node each drawn according to PXNr (x
N
r ) =
∏N
i=1 PXr (xr,i), index them as x
N
r (a), a ∈ [1, 2N(Rr−
′
)],
where
Rr = min{I(Xr;Z|X1), I(Xr;Z|X2), I(Xr;Y )}. (A19)
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Here note that
Rr ≥ I(Xr;Z). (A20)
– Second, generate 2N(I(X2;Y |Xr)−
′
) i.i.d. codewords xN2 according to PX2(x2), and divide them into 2
NR2
bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X2;Y |Xr)−
′−R2) codewords, where
I(X2;Y |Xr)− ′ −R2 = I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ . (A21)
– Third, generate 2N(I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)−
′
) i.i.d. codewords xN1 according to PX1(x1), and divide them into
2NR1 bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)−
′−R1) codewords.
• Code-book Construction for case 2:
– Generate at random 2N(Rr−
′
) i.i.d. sequences at the relay node each drawn according to PXNr (x
N
r ) =∏N
i=1 PXr (xr,i), index them as x
N
r (a), a ∈ [1, 2N(Rr−
′
)], where
Rr = I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z). (A22)
– Second, generate 2N(I(X2;Y |Xr)−
′
) i.i.d. codewords xN2 according to PX2(x2), and divide them into 2
NR2
bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X2;Y |Xr)−
′−R2) codewords, where
I(X2;Y |Xr)− ′ −R2 = I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ . (A23)
– Third, generate 2N(I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)−
′
) i.i.d. codewords xN1 according to PX1(x1), and divide them into
2NR1 bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)−
′−R1) codewords, where
I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− ′ −R1 = I(X1;Z|Xr)− ′ . (A24)
Encoding for both cases:
The relay uniformly picks a codeword xNr (a) from [1, 2
N(Rr−′ )], and sends xNr (a).
For a given confidential message w2, randomly choose a codeword xN2 in bin w2 to transmit. Similarly, for a
given confidential message w1, randomly choose a codeword xN1 in bin w1 to transmit.
Decoding for both cases:
For a given yN , try to find a sequence xNr (aˆ) such that (x
N
r (aˆ), y
N ) are jointly typical. If there exists a unique
sequence with the index aˆ, put out the corresponding aˆ, else declare a decoding error. Based on the AEP and (A19)
(or (A22)), the probability Pr{aˆ = a} goes to 1.
After decoding aˆ, the legitimate receiver tries to find a sequence xN2 (wˆ2) such that (x
N
2 (wˆ2), x
N
r (aˆ), y
N ) are
jointly typical. If there exists a unique sequence with the index wˆ2, put out the corresponding wˆ2, else declare a
decoding error. Based on the AEP and the construction of xN2 for both cases, the probability Pr{wˆ2 = w2} goes
to 1.
Finally, after decoding aˆ and wˆ2, the legitimate receiver tries to find a sequence xN1 (wˆ1) such that
(xN1 (wˆ1), x
N
2 (wˆ2), x
N
r (aˆ), y
N ) are jointly typical. If there exists a unique sequence with the index wˆ1, put out the
corresponding wˆ1, else declare a decoding error. Based on the AEP and the construction of xN1 for both cases, the
probability Pr{wˆ1 = w1} goes to 1.
20
Pe ≤  is easy to be checked by using the above encoding-decoding schemes. Now, it remains to prove ∆ ≥
R1 +R2 −  for both cases, see the followings.
Equivocation Analysis:
Proof of ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 1:
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
=
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|W1, ZN )). (A25)
The first term in (A25) is bounded as follows.
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) = 1
N
(H(W1, Z
N )−H(ZN ))
=
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r )−H(XN1 , XNr |W1, ZN )−H(ZN ))
(a)
=
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 , XNr ) +H(XN1 ) +H(XNr )−H(XN1 , XNr |W1, ZN )−H(ZN ))
=
1
N
(H(XN1 ) +H(X
N
r )− I(XN1 , XNr ;ZN )−H(XN1 , XNr |W1, ZN )), (A26)
where (a) follows from W1 → (XN1 , XNr )→ ZN , H(W1|XN1 ) = 0 and the fact that XN1 is independent of XNr .
Consider the first term in (A26), the code-book generation of xN1 shows that the total number of x
N
1 is
2N(I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)−
′
). Thus, using the same approach as that in [7, Lemma 3], we have
1
N
H(XN1 ) ≥ I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− 
′ − 1,N , (A27)
where 1,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the second term in (A26), the code-book generation of xNr guarantees that
1
N
H(XNr ) ≥ Rr − 
′ − 2,N , (A28)
where 2,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the third term in (A26), since the channel is memoryless, and XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r are i.i.d. generated, we get
1
N
I(XN1 , X
N
r ;Z
N ) = I(X1, Xr;Z). (A29)
Now, we consider the last term of (A26). Given w1, the wiretapper can do joint decoding. Specifically, given zN
and w1,
1
N
H(XN1 , X
N
r |W1, ZN ) ≤ 3,N (A30)
(3,N → 0 as N →∞) is guaranteed if Rr ≤ I(Xr;Z|X1) and Rr ≥ I(Xr;Z), and this is from the properties of
AEP (similar argument is used in the proof of [18, Theorem 3]). By checking (A19) and (A20), (A30) is obtained.
Substituting (A27), (A28), (A29) and (A30) into (A26), we have
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ I(X1;Y |X2, Xr) +Rr − I(X1, Xr;Z)− 2′ − 1,N − 2,N − 3,N . (A31)
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The second term in (A25) is bounded as follows.
1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN ) ≥ 1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN , XN1 , XNr )
(1)
=
1
N
H(W2|ZN , XN1 , XNr )
=
1
N
(H(W2, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r )−H(ZN , XN1 , XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(W2, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r , X
N
2 )−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr )−H(ZN , XN1 , XNr ))
(2)
=
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 , XN2 , XNr ) +H(XNr ) +H(XN1 ) +H(XN2 )
−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr )−H(ZN |XN1 , XNr )−H(XN1 )−H(XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(XN2 )− I(XN2 ;ZN |XN1 , XNr )−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr )), (A32)
where (1) is from the Markov chain W1 → (ZN , XN1 , XNr ) → W2, and (2) is from the Markov chain W2 →
(XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r )→ ZN , H(W2|XN2 ) = 0, and the fact that XN1 , XN2 and XNr are independent.
Consider the first term in (A32), the code-book generation of xN2 shows that the total number of x
N
2 is
2N(I(X2;Y |Xr)−
′
). Thus, using the same approach as that in [7, Lemma 3], we have
1
N
H(XN2 ) ≥ I(X2;Y |Xr)− 
′ − 4,N , (A33)
where 4,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the second term in (A32), since the channel is memoryless, and XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r are i.i.d. generated, we get
1
N
I(XN2 ;Z
N |XN1 , XNr ) = I(X2;Z|X1, Xr). (A34)
Now, we consider the last term of (A32). Given ZN , XN1 , X
N
r and W2, the total number of possible codewords
of xN2 is 2
N(I(X2;Y |Xr)−′−R2). By using the Fano’s inequality and (A21), we have
1
N
H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr ) ≤ 5,N , (A35)
where 5,N → 0 as N →∞.
Substituting (A33), (A34) and (A35) into (A32), we have
1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN ) ≥ I(X2;Y |Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ − 4,N − 5,N . (A36)
Substituting (A31) and (A36) into (A25), and choosing 
′
and sufficiently large N such that 3
′
+ 1,N + 2,N +
3,N + 4,N + 5,N ≤ , ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 1 is proved.
Proof of ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 2:
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
=
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|W1, ZN )). (A37)
22
The first term in (A37) is bounded as follows.
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ 1
N
H(W1|ZN , XNr )
=
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XNr )−H(ZN , XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr )−H(ZN , XNr ))
(a)
=
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 , XNr ) +H(XN1 ) +H(XNr )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr )
−H(ZN |XNr )−H(XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(XN1 )− I(XN1 ;ZN |XNr )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr )), (A38)
where (a) follows from W1 → (XN1 , XNr )→ ZN , H(W1|XN1 ) = 0 and the fact that XN1 is independent of XNr .
Consider the first term in (A38), the code-book generation of xN1 shows that the total number of x
N
1 is
2N(I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)−
′
). Thus, using the same approach as that in [7, Lemma 3], we have
1
N
H(XN1 ) ≥ I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− 
′ − 1,N , (A39)
where 1,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the second term in (A38), since the channel is memoryless, and XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r are i.i.d. generated, we get
1
N
I(XN1 ;Z
N |XNr ) = I(X1;Z|Xr). (A40)
Now, we consider the last term of (A38). Given ZN , XNr and W1, the total number of possible codewords of
xN1 is 2
N(I(X1;Y |X2,Xr)−′−R1). By using the Fano’s inequality and (A24), we have
1
N
H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr ) ≤ 2,N , (A41)
where 2,N → 0 as N →∞.
Substituting (A39), (A40) and (A41) into (A38), we have
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ I(X1;Y |X2, Xr)− I(X1;Z|Xr)− ′ − 1,N − 2,N . (A42)
The second term in (A37) is bounded the same as that for case 1, and thus, we have
1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN ) ≥ I(X2;Y |Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ − 3,N − 4,N , (A43)
where 3,N , 4,N → 0 as N →∞. The proof is omitted here.
Substituting (A42) and (A43) into (A37), and choosing 
′
and sufficiently large N such that 2
′
+ 1,N + 2,N +
3,N + 4,N ≤ , ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 2 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
For Theorem 3, we only need to prove that the corner points of L3 and L4 are achievable, see the followings.
• (Case 1) If I(Xr;Y ) ≥ I(Xr;Z), we allow the legitimate receiver to decode xNr , and the wiretapper can not
decode it. For case 1, it is sufficient to show that the pair (R1, R2) ∈ L3 with the condition
R1 = I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− I(X1, Xr;Z) +R∗, R2 = I(X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr) (A44)
is achievable. The achievability proof of the other corner point (R1 = I(X1;Y, Yˆr|Xr)−I(X1;Z|X2, Xr), R2 =
I(X2;Y, Yˆr|X1, Xr)− I(X2, Xr;Z) +R∗) follows by symmetry. Here note that R∗ satisfies
min{I(Xr;Z|X1), I(Xr;Z|X2), I(Xr;Y )} −R∗ ≥ I(Yr; Yˆr|Xr). (A45)
• (Case 2) If I(Yr; Yˆr|Xr) ≤ I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z), we allow both the receivers to decode xNr . For case 2, it
is sufficient to show that the pair (R1, R2) ∈ L4 with the condition
R1 = I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− I(X1;Z|Xr), R2 = I(X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr) (A46)
is achievable. The achievability proof of the other corner point (R1 = I(X1;Y, Yˆr|Xr)−I(X1;Z|X2, Xr), R2 =
I(X2;Y, Yˆr|X1, Xr)− I(X2;Z|Xr)) follows by symmetry.
Fix the joint probability mass function PYˆr|Yr,Xr (yˆr|yr, xr)PY,Z,Yr|Xr,X1,X2(y, z, yr|xr, x1, x2)PXr (xr)PX1(x1)PX2(x2).
Define the messages W1, W2 taking values in the alphabets W1, W2, respectively, where
W1 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}, W2 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}.
Code-book Construction for the Two Cases:
• Code-book construction for case 1:
– First, generate at random 2N(R
∗
r1−
′
) (
′
is a small positive number) i.i.d. sequences xNr at the relay node
each drawn according to PXNr (x
N
r ) =
∏N
i=1 PXr (xr,i), index them as x
N
r (a), a ∈ [1, 2N(R
∗
r1−
′
)], where
R∗r1 = min{I(Xr;Z|X1), I(Xr;Z|X2), I(Xr;Y )}. (A47)
Here note that
R∗r1 ≥ I(Xr;Z). (A48)
For each xNr (a) (a ∈ [1, 2N(R
∗
r1−
′
)]), generate at random 2N(R
∗
r1−
′−R∗) i.i.d. yˆNr according to PYˆ Nr |XNr (yˆ
N
r |xNr ) =∏N
i=1 PYˆr|Xr (yˆr,i|xr,i). Label these yˆNr as yˆNr (m, a), m ∈ [1, 2N(R
∗
r1−
′−R∗)], a ∈ [1, 2N(R∗r1−′ )]. Equally
divide 2N(R
∗
r1−
′
) sequences of xNr into 2
N(R∗r1−
′−R∗) bins, hence there are 2NR
∗
sequences of xNr at
each bin.
– Second, generate 2N(I(X2;Y,Yˆr|Xr)−
′
) i.i.d. codewords xN2 according to PX2(x2), and divide them into
2NR2 bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X2;Y,Yˆr|Xr)−
′−R2) codewords, where
I(X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− ′ −R2 = I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ . (A49)
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– Third, generate 2N(I(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr)−
′
+R∗−R∗r1) i.i.d. codewords xN1 according to PX1(x1), and divide
them into 2NR1 bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr)−
′
+R∗−R∗r1−R1) codewords. Here note that
from (A45) and (A47), we know that R∗ ≤ R∗r1, and thus, we have
I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− ′ +R∗ −R∗r1 ≤ I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− 
′
. (A50)
In addition, by using R1 = I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− I(X1, Xr;Z) +R∗, the codewords xN1 in each bin is
upper bounded by
I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− ′ +R∗ −R∗r1 −R1
= I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− ′ +R∗ −R∗r1
−(I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− I(X1, Xr;Z) +R∗)
= I(X1, Xr;Z)−R∗r1 − 
′
(a)
≤ I(X1, Xr;Z)− I(Xr;Z)− ′
= I(X1;Z|Xr)− ′ , (A51)
where (a) is from (A48).
• Code-book Construction for case 2:
– First, generate at random 2N(R
∗
r2−
′
) i.i.d. sequences xNr at the relay node each drawn according to
PXNr (x
N
r ) =
∏N
i=1 PXr (xr,i), index them as x
N
r (a), a ∈ [1, 2N(R
∗
r2−
′
)], where
R∗r2 = I(Xr;Y ) ≤ I(Xr;Z). (A52)
For each xNr (a) (a ∈ [1, 2N(R
∗
r2−
′
)]), generate at random 2N(R
∗
r2−
′
) i.i.d. yˆNr according to PYˆ Nr |XNr (yˆ
N
r |xNr ) =∏N
i=1 PYˆr|Xr (yˆr,i|xr,i). Label these yˆNr as yˆNr (a), a ∈ [1, 2N(R
∗
r2−
′
)].
– Second, generate 2N(I(X2;Y,Yˆr|Xr)−
′
) i.i.d. codewords xN2 according to PX2(x2), and divide them into
2NR2 bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X2;Y,Yˆr|Xr)−
′−R2) codewords, where
I(X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− ′ −R2 = I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ . (A53)
– Third, generate 2N(I(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr)−
′
) i.i.d. codewords xN1 according to PX1(x1), and divide them into
2NR1 bins. Each bin contains 2N(I(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr)−
′−R1) codewords, where
I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− ′ −R1 = I(X1;Z|Xr)− ′ . (A54)
Encoding:
Encoding involves the mapping of message indices to channel inputs, which are facilitated by the sequences
generated above. We exploit the block Markov coding scheme, as argued in [23], the loss induced by this scheme
is negligible as the number of blocks n→∞. For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), encoding proceeds as follows.
First, for convenience, the messages w1 and w2 transmitted in the i-th block are denoted by w1,i and w2,i,
respectively. yNr (i) and yˆ
N
r (i) are the y
N
r and yˆ
N
r for the i-th block, respectively.
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• Encoding for case 1:
At the end of block i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), assume that (xNr (ai), yNr (i), yˆNr (mi, ai)) are jointly typical, then we choose
ai+1 uniformly from bin mi, and the relay sends xNr (ai+1) at block i+ 1. In the first block, the relay sends
xNr (1).
For a given confidential message w2, randomly choose a codeword xN2 in bin w2 to transmit. Similarly, for a
given confidential message w1, randomly choose a codeword xN1 in bin w1 to transmit.
• Encoding for case 2:
In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the relay randomly choose an index ai from [1, 2N(R∗r2−
′
)], and sends xNr (ai) and
yˆNr (ai).
For a given confidential message w2, randomly choose a codeword xN2 in bin w2 to transmit. Similarly, for a
given confidential message w1, randomly choose a codeword xN1 in bin w1 to transmit.
Decoding:
• Decoding for case 1:
(At the relay) At the end of block i, the relay already has ai, it then decides mi by choosing mi such that
(xNr (ai), y
N
r (i), yˆ
N
r (mi, ai)) are jointly typical. There exists such mi, if
R∗r1 −R∗ ≥ I(Yr; Yˆr|Xr), (A55)
and N is sufficiently large. Choose ai+1 uniformly from bin mi.
(At the legitimate receiver) The legitimate receiver does backward decoding. The decoding process starts at
the last block n, the legitimate receiver decodes an by choosing unique aˇn such that (xNr (aˇn), y
N (n)) are
jointly typical. Since R∗r1 satisfies (A47), the probability Pr{aˇn = an} goes to 1 for sufficiently large N .
Next, the legitimate receiver moves to the block n−1. Now it already has aˇn, hence we also have mˇn−1 = f(aˇn)
(here f is a deterministic function, which means that mˇn−1 can be determined by aˇn). It first declares that
aˇn−1 is received, if aˇn−1 is the unique one such that (xNr (aˇn−1), y
N (n − 1)) are joint typical. If (A47)
is satisfied, aˇn−1 = an−1 with high probability. After knowing aˇn−1, the destination gets an estimation of
w2,n−1 by picking the unique wˇ2,n−1 such that (xN2 (wˇ2,n−1), yˆ
N
r (mˇn−1, aˇn−1), y
N (n − 1), xNr (aˇn−1)) are
jointly typical. We will have wˇ2,n−1 = w2,n−1 with high probability, if the codewords of xN2 is upper bounded
by 2NI(X2;Y,Yˆr|Xr) and N is sufficiently large.
After decoding wˇ2,n−1, the legitimate receiver tries to find a quintuple such that
(xN1 (wˇ1,n−1), x
N
2 (wˇ2,n−1), yˆ
N
r (mˇn−1, aˇn−1), y
N (n−1), xNr (aˇn−1)) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the
probability Pr{wˇ1,n−1 = w1,n−1} goes to 1 if the codewords of xN1 is upper bounded by 2NI(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr)
and N is sufficiently large.
The decoding scheme of the legitimate receiver in block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2) is similar to that in block n − 1,
and we omit it here.
• Decoding for case 2:
(At the relay) The relay does not need to decode any codeword.
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(At the legitimate receiver) In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the legitimate receiver decodes ai by choosing unique aˇi
such that (xNr (aˇi), y
N (i)) are jointly typical. Since R∗r2 satisfies (A52), the probability Pr{aˇi = ai} goes to
1 for sufficiently large N .
Now since the legitimate receiver has aˇi, he also knows yˆNr (aˇi). Then he gets an estimation of w2,i by picking
the unique wˇ2,i such that (xN2 (wˇ2,i), yˆ
N
r (aˇi), y
N (i), xNr (aˇi)) are jointly typical. We will have wˇ2,i = w2,i with
high probability, if the codewords of xN2 is upper bounded by 2
NI(X2;Y,Yˆr|Xr) and N is sufficiently large.
After decoding wˇ2,i, the legitimate receiver tries to find a quintuple such that
(xN1 (wˇ1,i), x
N
2 (wˇ2,i), yˆ
N
r (aˇi), y
N (i), xNr (aˇi)) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{wˇ1,i =
w1,i} goes to 1 if the codewords of xN1 is upper bounded by 2NI(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr) and N is sufficiently large.
Pe ≤  is easy to be checked by using the above encoding-decoding schemes. Now, it remains to prove ∆ ≥
R1 +R2 −  for both cases, see the followings.
Equivocation Analysis:
Proof of ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 1:
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
=
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|W1, ZN )). (A56)
The first term in (A56) is bounded as follows.
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) = 1
N
(H(W1, Z
N )−H(ZN ))
=
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r )−H(XN1 , XNr |W1, ZN )−H(ZN ))
(a)
=
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 , XNr ) +H(XN1 ) +H(XNr )−H(XN1 , XNr |W1, ZN )−H(ZN ))
=
1
N
(H(XN1 ) +H(X
N
r )− I(XN1 , XNr ;ZN )−H(XN1 , XNr |W1, ZN )), (A57)
where (a) follows from W1 → (XN1 , XNr )→ ZN , H(W1|XN1 ) = 0 and the fact that XN1 is independent of XNr .
Consider the first term in (A57), the code-book generation of xN1 shows that the total number of x
N
1 is upper
bounded by (A51). Thus, using the same approach as that in [7, Lemma 3], we have
1
N
H(XN1 ) ≥ I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr) +R∗ −R∗r1 − 
′ − 1,N , (A58)
where 1,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the second term in (A57), the code-book generation of xNr and [7, Lemma 3] guarantee that
1
N
H(XNr ) ≥ R∗r1 − 
′ − 2,N , (A59)
where 2,N → 0 as N →∞.
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For the third term in (A57), since the channel is memoryless, and XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r are i.i.d. generated, we get
1
N
I(XN1 , X
N
r ;Z
N ) = I(X1, Xr;Z). (A60)
Now, we consider the last term of (A57). Given w1, the wiretapper can do joint decoding. Specifically, given zN
and w1,
1
N
H(XN1 , X
N
r |W1, ZN ) ≤ 3,N (A61)
(3,N → 0 as N → ∞) is guaranteed if Rr ≤ I(Xr;Z|X1) and I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr) − ′ + R∗ − R∗r1 − R1 ≤
I(X1;Z|Xr), and this is from the properties of AEP (similar argument is used in the proof of [18, Theorem 3]).
By checking (A47) and (A51), (A61) is obtained.
Substituting (A58), (A59), (A60) and (A61) into (A57), we have
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr) +R∗ − I(X1, Xr;Z)− 2′ − 1,N − 2,N − 3,N . (A62)
The second term in (A56) is bounded as follows.
1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN ) ≥ 1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN , XN1 , XNr )
(1)
=
1
N
H(W2|ZN , XN1 , XNr )
=
1
N
(H(W2, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r )−H(ZN , XN1 , XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(W2, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r , X
N
2 )−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr )−H(ZN , XN1 , XNr ))
(2)
=
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 , XN2 , XNr ) +H(XNr ) +H(XN1 ) +H(XN2 )
−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr )−H(ZN |XN1 , XNr )−H(XN1 )−H(XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(XN2 )− I(XN2 ;ZN |XN1 , XNr )−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr )), (A63)
where (1) is from the Markov chain W1 → (ZN , XN1 , XNr ) → W2, and (2) is from the Markov chain W2 →
(XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r )→ ZN , H(W2|XN2 ) = 0, and the fact that XN1 , XN2 and XNr are independent.
Consider the first term in (A63), using the same approach as that in [7, Lemma 3], we have
1
N
H(XN2 ) ≥ I(X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− 
′ − 4,N , (A64)
where 4,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the second term in (A63), since the channel is memoryless, and XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r are i.i.d. generated, we get
1
N
I(XN2 ;Z
N |XN1 , XNr ) = I(X2;Z|X1, Xr). (A65)
Now, we consider the last term of (A63). Given ZN , XN1 , X
N
r and W2, the total number of possible codewords
of xN2 is 2
N(I(X2;Y,Yˆr|Xr)−′−R2). By using the Fano’s inequality and (A49), we have
1
N
H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 , XNr ) ≤ 5,N . (A66)
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Substituting (A64), (A65) and (A66) into (A63), we have
1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN ) ≥ I(X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ − 4,N − 5,N . (A67)
Substituting (A62) and (A67) into (A56), and choosing 
′
and sufficiently large N such that 3
′
+ 1,N + 2,N +
3,N + 4,N + 5,N ≤ , ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 1 is proved.
Proof of ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 2:
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
=
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|W1, ZN )). (A68)
The first term in (A68) is bounded as follows.
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ 1
N
H(W1|ZN , XNr )
=
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XNr )−H(ZN , XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
r )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr )−H(ZN , XNr ))
(a)
=
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 , XNr ) +H(XN1 ) +H(XNr )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr )
−H(ZN |XNr )−H(XNr ))
=
1
N
(H(XN1 )− I(XN1 ;ZN |XNr )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr )), (A69)
where (a) follows from W1 → (XN1 , XNr )→ ZN , H(W1|XN1 ) = 0 and the fact that XN1 is independent of XNr .
Consider the first term in (A69), the code-book generation of xN1 shows that the total number of x
N
1 is
2N(I(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr)−
′
). Thus, using the same approach as that in [7, Lemma 3], we have
1
N
H(XN1 ) ≥ I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− 
′ − 1,N , (A70)
where 1,N → 0 as N →∞.
For the second term in (A69), since the channel is memoryless, and XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r are i.i.d. generated, we get
1
N
I(XN1 ;Z
N |XNr ) = I(X1;Z|Xr). (A71)
Now, we consider the last term of (A69). Given ZN , XNr and W1, the total number of possible codewords of
xN1 is 2
N(I(X1;Y,Yˆr|X2,Xr)−′−R1). By using the Fano’s inequality and (A54), we have
1
N
H(XN1 |W1, ZN , XNr ) ≤ 2,N , (A72)
where 2,N → 0 as N →∞.
Substituting (A70), (A71) and (A72) into (A69), we have
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ I(X1;Y, Yˆr|X2, Xr)− I(X1;Z|Xr)− ′ − 1,N − 2,N . (A73)
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The second term in (A68) is bounded the same as that for case 1, and thus, we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W2|W1, ZN ) ≥ I(X2;Y, Yˆr|Xr)− I(X2;Z|X1, Xr)− ′ − 3,N − 4,N . (A74)
The proof is omitted here.
Substituting (A73) and (A74) into (A68), and choosing 
′
and sufficiently large N such that 2
′
+ 1,N + 2,N +
3,N + 4,N ≤ , ∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  for case 2 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 4: all the achievable secrecy pairs (R1, R2) of the degraded discrete memoryless
MARC-WT are contained in the set Rddo. We will prove the inequalities of Theorem 4 in the remainder of this
section.
(Proof of R1 ≤ I(X1, Xr;Y |X2, U)− I(X1;Z|U)):
R1 −  = 1
N
H(W1)− 
(1)
≤ 1
N
H(W1|ZN )
(2)
≤ 1
N
(H(W1|ZN )−H(W1|ZN ,W2, Y N , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
(3)
=
1
N
(H(W1|ZN )−H(W1|ZN , Y N , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(W1;Y
N , XN2 |ZN ) + δ(Pe))
≤ 1
N
(H(Y N , XN2 |ZN )−H(Y N , XN2 |ZN ,W1, XN1 ) + δ(Pe))
(4)
=
1
N
(H(Y N , XN2 |ZN )−H(Y N , XN2 |ZN , XN1 ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(Y N , XN2 ;X
N
1 |ZN ) + δ(Pe))
(5)
=
1
N
(H(XN1 |ZN )−H(XN1 |ZN , Y N , XN2 )−H(XN1 ) +H(XN1 |XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
(6)
=
1
N
(I(XN1 ;Y
N |XN2 )− I(XN1 ;ZN ) + δ(Pe))
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 , X
N
r ;Y
N |XN2 )− I(XN1 ;ZN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, XN2 )−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1, XN1 )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(7)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, XN2 , Zi−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1, XN1 )) +
δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|X2,i, Zi−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|Zi−1, X1,i)) + δ(Pe)
N
(8)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|X2,i, Zi−1, J = i)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1, J = i)−H(Zi|Zi−1, J = i)
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+H(Zi|Zi−1, X1,i, J = i)) + δ(Pe)
N
(9)
= H(YJ |X2,J , ZJ−1, J)−H(YJ |X1,J , X2,J , Xr,J , ZJ−1, J)−H(ZJ |ZJ−1, J) +H(ZJ |ZJ−1, X1,J , J) + δ(Pe)
N
(10)
= I(X1, Xr;Y |X2, U)− I(X1;Z|U) + δ(Pe)
N
, (A75)
where (1) is from the fact that the secrecy requirement on the full message set also ensures the secrecy of individual
message (see (2.3)), (2) is from the Fanos inequality, (3) is from H(W2|XN2 ) = 0, (4) is from H(W1|XN1 ) = 0, (5)
and (6) are from the fact that the wiretap channel is degraded, which implies the Markov chain XN1 → (XN2 , Y N )→
ZN , and from the fact that XN1 is independent of X
N
2 , (7) is from the Markov chains Yi → (Y i−1, XN2 )→ Zi−1
and Yi → (X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i) → Zi−1 (these Markov chains are also from the fact that the wiretap channel is
degraded), (8) is from J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent
of XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r , Y
N and ZN , (9) is from J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}, and (10) is from the
definitions that X1 , X1,J , X2 , X2,J , Xr , Xr,J , Y , YJ , Z , ZJ and U , (ZJ−1, J).
By using Pe ≤  and letting → 0, R1 ≤ I(X1, Xr;Y |X2, U)− I(X1;Z|U) is proved.
(Proof of R2 ≤ I(X2, Xr;Y |X1, U)− I(X2;Z|U)):
The proof is analogous to the proof of R1 ≤ I(X1, Xr;Y |X2, U)− I(X1;Z|U), and it is omitted here.
Proof of R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2, Xr;Y |U)− I(X1, X2;Z|U):
R1 +R2 − 
(1)
≤ ∆ = 1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
(2)
≤ 1
N
(H(W1,W2|ZN ) + δ(Pe)−H(W1,W2|Y N , ZN ))
≤ 1
N
(H(Y N |ZN )−H(Y N |ZN ,W1,W2, XN1 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
(3)
=
1
N
(H(Y N |ZN )−H(Y N |ZN , XN1 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(XN1 , X
N
2 ;Y
N )− I(XN1 , XN2 ;ZN ) + δ(Pe))
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 , X
N
2 , X
N
r ;Y
N )− I(XN1 , XN2 ;ZN ) + δ(Pe))
(4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1)) + δ(Pe)
N
(5)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Zi−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1)) + δ(Pe)
N
(6)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Zi−1, J = i)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1, J = i)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, J = i) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1, J = i)) + δ(Pe)
N
(7)
= H(YJ |ZJ−1, J)−H(YJ |X1,J , X2,J , Xr,J , ZJ−1, J)
−H(ZJ |ZJ−1, J) +H(ZJ |X1,J , X2,J , ZJ−1, J) + δ(Pe)
N
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(8)
≤ I(X1, X2, Xr;Y |U)− I(X1, X2;Z|U) + δ()
N
, (A76)
where (1) is from (2.2), (2) is from the Fanos inequality, (3) is from (W1,W2) → (XN1 , XN2 , ZN ) → Y N , (4)
is from Yi → (X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i) → Zi−1, (5) is from Yi → Y i−1 → Zi−1, (6) is from J is a random variable
(uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of XN1 , XN2 , XNr , Y N and ZN , (7) is from J is
uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}, and (8) is from the definitions that X1 , X1,J , X2 , X2,J , Xr , Xr,J ,
Y , YJ , Z , ZJ and U , (ZJ−1, J), and the fact that Pe ≤ .
Letting → 0, R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2, Xr;Y |U)− I(X1, X2;Z|U) is proved.
The proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Since N2 ≥ N1, the GMARC-WT reduces to a kind of degraded MARC-WT with the Markov chain (X1, X2, Xr, Yr)→
Y → Z, and thus the outer bound Rgout can be obtained from Theorem 4. The details are as follows.
From (A75), we know that
R1 ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(h(Yi|X2,i, Zi−1)− h(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)
−h(Zi|Zi−1) + h(Zi|Zi−1, X1,i)) + δ(Pe)
N
. (A77)
Analogously,
R2 ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(h(Yi|X1,i, Zi−1)− h(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)− h(Zi|Zi−1)
+h(Zi|Zi−1, X2,i)) + δ(Pe)
N
. (A78)
From (A76), we have
R1 +R2 ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(h(Yi|Zi−1)− h(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)− h(Zi|Zi−1)
+h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1)) + δ(Pe)
N
). (A79)
It remains to bound the conditional entropies in (A77), (A78) and (A79), see the followings.
First note that
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1) ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i)
(1)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Z2,i +Xr,i)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie(E[X2r,i] +N2)
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(2)
≤ 1
2
log 2pie(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X2r,i] +N2)
≤ 1
2
log 2pie(Pr +N2), (A80)
where (1) is from Zi = X1,i +X2,i +Xr,i + Z2,i, and (2) is from Jensen’s inequality.
On the other hand,
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1) ≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)
(a)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Z2,i)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pieN2 =
1
2
log 2pieN2, (A81)
where (a) is from the Markov chain Zi−1 → (X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i)→ Zi.
Combining (A80) and (A81), we establish that there exists some α ∈ [0, 1] such that
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1) = 1
2
log 2pie(αPr +N2). (A82)
Second, since
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, Zi−1) ≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Zi−1)
=
1
2
log 2pie(αPr +N2), (A83)
and
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, Zi−1) ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Z2,i +X2,i +Xr,i)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie(E[X2r,i] + E[X
2
2,i] +N2)
≤ 1
2
log 2pie(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X2r,i] +
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X22,i] +N2)
≤ 1
2
log 2pie(Pr + P2 +N2), (A84)
we establish that there exists some β1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, Zi−1) = 1
2
log 2pie(αPr +N2 + β1(Pr + P2 +N2 − αPr −N2))
=
1
2
log 2pie(N2 + Pr(α+ β1 − αβ1) + β1P2). (A85)
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Third, analogously, there exists some β2 ∈ [0, 1] such that
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X2,i, Zi−1) = 1
2
log 2pie(N2 + Pr(α+ β2 − αβ2) + β2P1). (A86)
Fourth, since
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|Zi−1) ≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X1,i, Zi−1)
=
1
2
log 2pie(N2 + Pr(α+ β1 − αβ1) + β1P2), (A87)
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|Zi−1) ≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|X2,i, Zi−1)
=
1
2
log 2pie(N2 + Pr(α+ β2 − αβ2) + β2P1) (A88)
and
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|Zi−1) ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Z2,i +X1,i +X2,i +Xr,i)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie(E[X2r,i] + E[X
2
1,i] + E[X
2
2,i] +N2)
≤ 1
2
log 2pie(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X2r,i] +
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X21,i] +
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X22,i] +N2)
≤ 1
2
log 2pie(Pr + P1 + P2 +N2), (A89)
there exists some γ ∈ [0, 1] such that
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Zi|Zi−1) = 1
2
log 2pie(C + γ(Pr + P1 + P2 +N2 − C)), (A90)
where C is given by
C = max{N2 + Pr(α+ β1 − αβ1) + β1P2, N2 + Pr(α+ β2 − αβ2) + β2P1}. (A91)
Fifth, by using the entropy power inequality, we have
22h(Zi|X1,i,Z
i−1) (1)= 22h(Yi+Z
′
2,i|X1,i,Zi−1)
(2)
≥ 22h(Yi|X1,i,Zi−1) + 22h(Z
′
2,i|X1,i,Zi−1)
(3)
= 22h(Yi|X1,i,Z
i−1) + 22h(Z
′
2,i), (A92)
where (1) is from the definition that Z
′
2,i = Z2,i − Z1,i, (2) is from the entropy power inequality, and (3) is from
Z
′
2,i is independent of X1,i and Z
i−1.
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Substituting h(Z
′
2,i) =
1
2 log 2pie(N2 −N1) and (A85) into (A92), and using Jensen’s inequality, we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Yi|X1,i, Zi−1) ≤ 1
2
log 2pie(Pr(α+ β1 − αβ1) + β1P2 +N1). (A93)
Analogously, we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Zi−1) ≤ 1
2
log 2pie(Pr(α+ β2 − αβ2) + β2P1 +N1), (A94)
and
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(Yi|Zi−1) ≤ 1
2
log 2pie(C + γ(Pr + P1 + P2 +N1 − C)). (A95)
Finally, note that
h(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1) = h(Z1,i|X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i, Zi−1)
(1)
= h(Z1,i) =
1
2
log 2pieN1, (A96)
where (1) is from Z1,i is independent of X1,i, X2,i, Xr,i and Zi−1.
Substituting (A82), (A85), (A86), (A90), (A93), (A94), (A95) and (A96) into (A77), (A78) and (A79), using the
fact that Pe ≤  and letting → 0, Theorem 8 is proved.
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